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RECENT CASES AND LEGISLATION

THE COLLATERAL ORDER DOCTRINE AS APPLIED
TO DISCOVERY REQUESTS-THE THIRD
CIRCUIT'S KELLY v. FORD MOTOR CO.
(IN RE FORD MOTOR CO.)
I.

INTRODUCTION

While the collateral order doctrine has been invoked in a vast
number of cases covering a wide array of issues, it has almost universally been held not to apply to discovery orders-pre-trial or otherwise. However, in Kelly v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Ford Motor Co.)' the
Third Circuit utilized a unique rationale in extending the collateral
order doctrine to include discovery orders. In so doing, the Fordcourt
allowed the immediate appeal of a non-final order-more specifically,
the appeal of a district court judge's decision concerning materials
that were claimed to be protected by either the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine, or both. In its analysis, the Third
Circuit failed to address a number of issues vital to a proper analysis of
the collateral order doctrine. In so doing, the Ford court reached an
illogical decision that is not only a radical departure from case precedent, but which may have serious negative ramifications on district
courts and circuit courts alike.
II.

GENERAL BACKGROUND

A.

Final Orders

The appellate jurisdictional statute invoked by the Third Circuit
in In re Ford Motor Co., was 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Section 1291 states in
pertinent part that "[t] he courts of appeals ...shall have jurisdiction
of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United
1 110 F.3d 954 (3d Cir. 1997).
1119
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States." 2 The requirement that a decision be final is obviously an essential element of § 1291 and most often it requires that the district
court issue a decision that completely ends the litigation and leaves
nothing left for the court to do but execute its judgment.3 This requirement of finality has been justified for a number of reasons, including efficiency in judicial administration, avoiding delay caused by
interlocutory appeals, and easing the burden on appellate courts by
avoiding a piecemeal review of a district court's numerous rulings in
the course of a typical case. 4 Additionally, "[a]llowing interlocutory
appeals before a final judgment on the merits erodes 'the deference
appellate courts owe to the district judge's decisions."5
Traditionally, if a party is unsatisfied with a discovery order, her
inability to file an immediate appeal does not leave her wholly without
recourse. The party's attorney can either appeal the decision after a
final judgment has been rendered, or she can gain the right of appeal
through the contempt process. This latter form of appeal is established when the attorney questioning the discovery order refuses to
comply with it, which forces the court to hold her in contempt, and
from that contempt order (which is considered a final judgment as to
her) she then appeals. 6 This, traditionally, has been the exclusive way
to immediately "appeal" a discovery order.
B.

CollateralOrder Doctrine-The Cohen Case

There is, however, an exception to the general rule that non-final
orders are not appealable. This exception, known as the collateral
order doctrine, was first espoused in 1949 by the Supreme Court in
Cohen v. Beneficial IndustrialLoan Corp.7 In Cohen,Justice Jackson and
the Court enunciated a three-prong test which is used to determine a
circuit court's jurisdiction over appeals stemming from non-final orders. In essence, if a circuit court determines that a particular issue is
completely independent and too important to be denied review, appeal will be granted immediately. According to Justice Jackson an appeal of a nonfinal order will lie if:
2 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994) (emphasis added).
3 See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467 (1978).
4 See, e.g., Boughton v. Cotter Corp., 10 F.3d 746, 748 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing
Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Finesilver, 546 F.2d 338, 342 (10th Cir. 1976)).
5 Id. at 748-49 (quoting Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 430

(1985)).
6
7

See, e.g., Bennett v. City of Boston, 54 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 1995).
337 U.S. 541 (1949).
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(1) the order from which the appellant appeals conclusively
determines the disputed question;
(2) the order resolves an important issue that is completely
separate from the merits of the dispute; and
(3) the order is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final
judgment.8
The collateral order doctrine, or Cohen test, has been applied to a
wide array of issues including qualified immunity,9 allocating the expense of identification of class members, 10 disqualification of coun12
sel," and double jeopardy.
However, the collateral order doctrine has almost universally
been held not to apply to discovery orders. This is true of all twelve
circuits' 3 as well as the Supreme Court. 14 The only cases which have

allowed the collateral order doctrine to be applied to a discovery issue
have involved orders to compel disclosure of trade secrets.' 5 These
unique cases show exactly how vital an issue must be before a court
will invoke the Cohen doctrine.
C.

Writ of Mandamus

In an effort to circumvent these holdings, many parties have attempted to obtain review of discovery orders by way of mandamus.
Issuance of a writ of mandamus is controlled by 28 U.S.C. § 1651.16 It
is abundantly clear that mandamus is an extraordinary remedy which
8 In reFordMotor Co., 110 F.3d at 958.
9 See Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299 (1996).
10 See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340 (1978).
11 See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368 (1981).

12

See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977).

13

See, e.g., Hahnemann Univ. Hosp. v. Edgar, 74 F.3d 456 (3d Cir. 1996); Bennett

v. City of Boston, 54 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 1995); McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, 52 F.3d 346 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Simmons v. City of Racine, PFC, 37 F.3d 325 (7th
Cir. 1994); MDK, Inc. v. Mike's Train House, Inc., 27 F.3d 116 (4th Cir. 1994);
Boughton v. Cotter Corp., 10 F.3d 746 (10th Cir. 1993); Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of
Am. v. Energy Gathering, Inc., 2 F.3d 1397 (5th Cir. 1993); Marchetti v. Bitterolf, 968
F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1992); Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Turner & Newall, PLC, 964
F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1992); FDIC v. Ernst & Whinney, 921 F.2d 83 (6th Cir. 1990); Cox v.
Piper,Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc., 848 F.2d 842 (8th Cir. 1988); Robinson v. Tanner, 798
F.2d 1378 (11th Cir. 1986).
14 See, e.g., Church of Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S. 9 (1992).
15 See, e.g., Smith v. BIC Corp., 869 F.2d 194 (3d Cir. 1989); IBM v. United States,
471 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1972).
16 Section 1651 states,
(a) The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress
may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.
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should only be issued in the most extreme cases.' 7 Issuance of a writ
of mandamus in connection with a discovery order is very rare and
usually involves extreme instances of an abuse of discretion by the district court judge or some obvious usurpation of judicial power. 18 In
many instances, the cases that have permitted mandamus review of
discovery orders have been based upon the fact that the order in question raised some important and unique issue of first impression. 19 As
aptly stated by the Third Circuit, "[g] iven its drastic nature, a writ of
mandamus should not be issued where relief may be obtained
20
through an ordinary appeal."
III.

CASE FAcrs AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In re Ford Motor Co. involved the death of Gerald Kelly. Mr. Kelly
was killed when the Ford Bronco II he was driving rolled over. Appellee Susan Kelly, wife of the decedent, claimed that Ford Motor defectively designed the Bronco II's center of gravity, thus making the
vehicle susceptible to a rollover. Appellee Kelly sought discovery of
documents concerning the design, development, marketing, and
safety of the Bronco II. Ford Motor answered her request for discovery by stating that because attorneys were present and trial strategy
was discussed the documents requested were shielded by the work
product doctrine or protected by attorney-client privilege, or both.
On October 4, 1996, the district court held that although the vast
majority of the documents requested were not discoverable, two sets
of documents were indeed discoverable. Those two sets of documents
(b) An alternative writ or rule nisi may be issued by ajustice orjudge of
a court which has jurisdiction.

28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1994).
17 See, e.g., La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957); Roberts v. United
States Dist. Court, 339 U.S. 844 (1950); Bank of Am. v. Feldman (In re Nat'l Mortgage
Equity Corp. Mortgage Pool Certificates Litig.), 821 F.2d 1422 (9th Cir. 1987).
18 See, e.g., Iowa Beef Processors, Inc. v. Bagley, 601 F.2d 949 (8th Cir. 1979) (issuing writ because of the abrupt and unexplained turnabout of the district court which
had issued a protective order for certain documents and then, without showing the
existence of any intervening circumstances, allowed disclosure without any restraints
on their use, less than ten months later). "[T] he power conferred by the All Writs Act
'is meant to be used only in the exceptional case where there is a clear abuse of
discretion."' Id. at 953 (quoting Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 383

(1953)).
19 See, e.g., InrePerrigo Co., 128 F.3d 430 (6th Cir. 1997); InreW.R. Grace & Co.Conn., 984 F.2d 587 (2d Cir. 1993); Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Turner & Newall,
PLC, 964 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1992).
20 Hahnemann Univ. Hosp. v. Edgar, 74 F.3d 456, 461 (3rd Cir. 1996) (citing

Bankers Life, 346 U.S. at 383.
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included the minutes of Ford Motor's Policy and Strategy Committee
and a set of agendas and notes explaining technical aspects of the
Bronco II litigation. After Ford Motor's request for reconsideration
was denied on November 13, 1996, the district court issued a letter
ruling on November 27, 1996 ordering the production of the documents on or before December 18, 1996. On December 18, 1996, Ford
Motor sought a stay of the motion to compel discovery and filed a
petition for both a notice of appeal (in which they asserted the collateral order doctrine) and a writ of mandamus.
IV.

A.

COURT'S HOLDING AND ANALYSIs

Appellate Jurisdiction-TheCohen Test

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the court of appeals "shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts."2 ' Furthermore, orders to compel discovery are generally not final decisions
and thus appellate jurisdiction cannot be obtained.22 However, the
Supreme Court has carved out a narrow exception-the Cohen doc23
trine-allowing appellate review.
1. The First Prong
The first prong of the Cohen test states that the order from which
the appellant appeals must conclusively determine the disputed question. Although the order need not be as clear as it is in Ford, the
district court's order requiring Ford Motor to produce the disputed
agendas and minutes does not allow for further review by the lower
court. Ford Motor and its lawyers were faced with the forced discovery
of the documents. 24 Therefore, the Third Circuit stated that "[i] t is
beyond cavil that the first element is satisfied" when the district court
issued the November 27, 1996 order requiring document production,
which left "no room for further consideration by the district court of
25
the claim that the documents [were] protected."
21 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994).
22

See Pacific Union Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Marshall, 434 U.S.

1305 (1977) (per Mr.Justice Rehnquist as CircuitJustice); Bank ofAm., 821 F.2d 1422.
23 See supra text accompanying notes 7-15
24

See Bennett v. City of Boston, 54 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 1995); Nancy C. Brown, Case

Note, Civil Procedure-Inre Rinehardt: A Party'sAttempt to Appeal an Interlocutory Order
of Discovery by Contrivinga Contempt CitationAgainst Its Designated Non-Pary Witness, 22
MEM. ST. L. REv. 157 (1991).
25 InreFordMotorCo.,110 F.3d at 958.
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The Second Prong

The second prong of the Cohen test is that the order resolves an
important issue that is completely separate from the merits of the dispute. The Third Circuit asserted that the question of whether an issue
is important must be examined not in relation to the jurisprudential
value of the question, but rather as to its relation with the final judgment rule. In other words, the test is not whether the resolution is
important to the body of existing case law in a particular jurisdiction,
but rather whether it is important to the controversy at hand. The
court wrote that the "issue is important if the interests that would potentially go unprotected without immediate appellate review of that
issue are significant relative to the efficiency interests sought to be
'26
advanced by adherence to the final judgment rule.
As Judge Becker explained:
What is important for present purposes is that... because of the
imperative of preventing impairment of some institutionally significant status or relationship, the danger of denying justice by reason
of delay in appellate adjudication outweighed the inefficiencies
flowing from interlocutory appeal. By the same calipers, we are convinced that in the present case the orange of the interests protected
by the attorney-client privilege (which would be eviscerated by
forced disclosure of privileged material) is sufficiently significant to
the apple of the interests protected by the final judgment rule to
27
satisfy the importance criterion of the second Cohen prong.
Additionally, the court stated that "[a]lthough one might assume that
collateral finality would be determined by a bright-line rule, the important determination under the Supreme Court's jurisprudence is
rather a function of a balancing process. '28 In this case, the court
found that, on balance, the interest protected by the attorney-client
privilege clearly outweighed the interest protected by the final judgment rule.

26 Id. at 959.
27 Id. at 960-61.
28 Id. at 960; see also Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 314-24 (1996) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (canvassing recent collateral order jurisprudence and noting that the im-

portance analysis is a balancing of interests); Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 315
(1995) (stating that in determining appealability a court must look to the competing
considerations that underlie questions of finality, namely "the inconvenience and
costs of piecemeal review on the one hand and the danger of denying justice by delay
on the other") (citation omitted).
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The Third Prong

The third prong of the Cohen doctrine is that the order must be
effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. The Ford
court cited Lauro Lines v. Chasser,29 for the proposition that "review
after final judgment is ineffective if the right sought to be protected
would be, for all practical and legal purposes, destroyed if it were not
vindicated prior to finaljudgment."30 In the case at hand, the damage
from the disclosure of attorney work product and attorney-client confidential materials cannot be undone by appeal from final judgment.
The Third Circuit concluded that "[a]t best, on appeal after final
judgment, an appellate court could send the case back for re-trial
without use of the protected materials. At that point, however, the cat
is already out of the bag."'
In an effort to refute contrary case precedent, the court claimed
that its decision with respect to the privilege and work product documents was buttressed by Supreme Court decisions in Puerto Rico
33
32
Aqueduct & Sewer Authority v. Metcalf &Eddy, Inc., Mitchell v. Forsyth,
6
3
35
Nixon v. Fitzgerald,3 4 Helstoski v. Meanor, and Abney v. United States.
Although none of these cases address the issues of attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine, they each applied the Cohen doctrine
and allowed an appeal of a non-final order. Consequently, the court
held that "there is no effective means of reviewing after a final judgment an order requiring the production of putatively protected material. Accordingly, the strictures of the collateral order doctrine have
37
been met in this case, and we have jurisdiction over the appeal."
B.

Writ of Mandamus

After concluding that the appellate jurisdiction was appropriate,
the court stated that "there is no need to examine whether we have
original, mandamus jurisdiction." 38 However, the court continued,
"we also believe that if we did not have appellate jurisdiction, we
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

490 U.S. 495 (1989).
In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d at 962.
Id. at 963.
506 U.S. 139 (1993) (examining Eleventh Amendment immunity).
472 U.S. 511 (1985) (examining qualified immunity).
457 U.S. 731 (1982) (examining absolute immunity).
442 U.S. 500 (1979) (examining the Speech and Debate Clause).
431 U.S. 651 (1977) (examining double jeopardy).
In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d at 964.

38

Id.
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would have mandamus jurisdiction to review the district court's
order."39

According to the court the essential difference between appellate
jurisdiction and mandamus jurisdiction is the standard of review.
Under mandamus jurisdiction, the review is narrow in scope, while
the standard of appellate review depends on the issue that is being
reviewed. Additionally, the court wrote that
mandamus jurisdiction affords an appellate court less opportunity
...to provide guidance for future cases. Moreover, comity between
the district and appellate courts is best served by resort to mandamus only in limited circumstances. Review under appellate jurisdicdon is therefore preferable to review under mandamus jurisdiction.
In light of this preference, the wisdom of our holding that an ap40
peal will lie in this case is confirmed.

V. ANALYSIS OF IN RE FORD MOTOR COMPANY
A.

Ineffective Remedy

In In re Ford Motor Company, the Third Circuit dealt with an issue
common to all cases-jurisdiction. The jurisdictional issue requires a
court to first determine if it has the power to decide a case before
itcan rule on the merits. Relying on the Cohen exception to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, the Ford court determined that its jurisdictional basis lay in
ordinary interlocutory appeal.
In analyzing the application of the collateral order doctrine to
the Ford case, there can be little debate that the first two prongs of the
Cohen test have been met. Clearly the district court's discovery order
conclusively determined the disputed question. 4 1 The question at
hand was whether the minutes of Ford Motor's Policy and Strategy
Committee and a set of agendas and notes explaining technical aspects of the Bronco II litigation were protected by either the attorneyclient privilege or the work product doctrine. The district court deter39 Id.; see, e.g., Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 861
(3d Cir. 1994) (exercising mandamus jurisdiction over review of privilege and work
product issues); Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 88-91 (3d Cir. 1992)

(exercising mandamus jurisdiction over review of work product issues); Westinghouse
Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1422 (3d Cir. 1991) (exercising mandamus jurisdiction over privilege and work product issues); Sporck v. Peil,
759 F.2d 312, 314-15 (3d Cir. 1985) (exercising mandamus jurisdiction over work
product issues); Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 738 F.2d 587, 591 (3d Cir. 1984) (exercising mandamus jurisdiction over work product issues).
40 In reFordMotor Co., 110 F.3d at 964.
41 See supra text accompanying notes 24-25.
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mined they were not. Furthermore, few would argue that the discovery order did not resolve an important issue that was completely
separate from the merits of the dispute. 4 2 The merits of the dispute
centered on the liability of Ford Motor Company in regards to the
death of Gerald Kelly. The order itself dealt only with whether the
documents in question were discoverable.
Therefore, the crux of the decision in In re Ford Motor Company
centered on the third prong of the Cohen test and more specifically,
on the fact that the Third Circuit now felt that appealing privilege and
work product issues only after a final judgment had been rendered
was an ineffective remedy. As the court put it, "once putatively protected material is disclosed, the very 'right sought to be protected' has
been destroyed."4 3
Before one begins the analysis of this reasoning, it is imperative
to mention the fact that the Third Circuit completely ignored the ability of an attorney to gain an appeal through the contempt process. By
defying the discovery order and being held in contempt, an attorney
can garner a full review of the district court's order without having to
reveal any of the material sought to be protected. By ignoring this
option of appeal, the Third Circuit ignored one of the key reasons
why courts find that discovery orders routinely fail to meet the third
prong of the Cohen test.44 Since a contempt order is considered a final judgment as to the attorney, it defies logic to then state that the
discovery order is "effectively unreviewable," as is required by Cohen.
Why the court chose not to deal with this issue is uncertain. Nonetheless, we can begin to examine the arguments promulgated by the Ford
court for allowing the immediate appeal of a non-final order.
As stated, the Third Circuit based its decision in Ford on the
grounds that appealing a discovery order only after a trial has concluded is an ineffective remedy. The court stated, "'[A] ttorneys cannot unlearn what has been disclosed to them in discovery'; they are
likely to use such material for evidentiary leads, strategy decisions, or
the like." 45 This sort of argument, however, is squarely at odds with
both long-standing precedent on this issue as well as the legislative
intent behind 28 U.S.C. § 1291. While the Ford court did provide a
number of colorful analogies to support its claim of irreparable
42 See supra text accompanying notes 26-28.
43 In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d at 963 (quoting Bogosian, 738 F.2d at 591).
44 See, e.g., Bennett v. City of Boston, 54 F.3d 18, 20 (1st Cir. 1995).
45 In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d at 963 (quoting Chase Manhattan Bank, NA. v.
Turner & Newvall, PLC, 964 F.2d 159, 165 (2d Cir. 1992)).
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harm, 4 6 it completely failed to address the competing interests that
§ 1291 was established to protect.
As stated by the Tenth Circuit in Boughton v. Cotter Corporation,
[wihile recognizing that most interlocutory orders disadvantage or
inflict some degree of harm on one of the parties to a litigation, this
court must balance that concern against the need for efficient judicial

administration, the delay caused by interlocutory appeals, and the
burden on appellate courts imposed by fragmentary and piecemeal
review of the district court's myriad rulings in the course of a typical
47
case.
These interests go to the very heart of why courts require a final order
before an appeal may be heard and must be considered in any analysis
of § 1291.
The Fordcourt did offer numerous cites and references to various
Supreme Court decisions in an effort to "buttress" its proposition concerning the ineffective remedy. However, these Supreme Court cases
do not deal with discovery issues. Instead, they address issues concerning the immediate appeal of immunity challenges, 48 double jeopardy challenges, 49 and speech and debate challenges. 50 While it is
true that each of these Supreme Court decisions did allow an immediate appeal, the Ford court made a leap that is supported by neither
precedent nor logic when it applied these immunity decisions to the
case at hand.
Unlike a discovery order, a claim of immunity or double jeopardy
is not merely a step towards a final judgment. A party claiming this
type of immunity is contesting the very authority of the government to
hale them into court. In Abney v. United States, the Supreme Court
stated "the guarantee against double jeopardy assures an individual
that, among other things, he will not be forced . . .to endure the

personal strain, public embarrassment, and expense of a criminal trial
more than once for the same offense."51 Therefore, if a party is not
granted an immediate appeal in these cases, the very right to not
stand trial is lost. This was simply not the case in Ford. The issue was
not whether the Ford Motor Company must stand trial, but whether it
46 See In re FordMotor Co., 110 F.3d at 963 ("[T]he cat is already out of the bag...
there is no way to unscramble the egg scrambled by the disclosure; the baby has been
thrown out with the bath water.")
47 Boughton v. Cotter Corp., 10 F.3d 746, 748 (10th Cir. 1993) (emphasis added).
48 See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
49 See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977).
50 See Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500 (1979).
51 Abney, 431 U.S. at 661.
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had to comply simply with another step towards the final disposition
of the case.
B. Evidentiary Leads and Strategy Decisions
Apparently, the Ford court also seemed extremely concerned with
the possibility that attorneys might use erroneously disclosed discovery
for "evidentiary leads" and "strategy decisions." While this concern
may seem legitimate, it can easily be dealt with after a final judgment
has been rendered, in an order to reverse by the court of appeals. As
stated in the Boughton case:
If this court determines that privileged documents were wrongly
turned over to the plaintiffs and were used to the detriment of defendants at trial, we can reverse any adverse judgment and require a
new trial, forbidding any use of the improperly disclosed documents. Plaintiffs would also be forbidden to offer at trial any documents, witnesses, or other evidence obtained as a consequence of
52
their access to the privileged documents.
It is not uncommon for a court to issue such a decree. For example,
when police illegally obtain a statement from a criminal defendant,
courts quite often decree that evidence flowing from such statements
cannot be used at trial.53 And as stated by the Second Circuit in 1967,
when privileged material is erroneously disseminated, "the harm occasioned resembles that suffered in any retrial because of error in the
first."5 4 If, however, this decree is not enough to keep attorneys from

using the erroneously disseminated material (as the Fordcourt seemed
to imply), the problem may very well be one of ethics and not effective
remedy.
C. Attorney-Client Privilege
Another argument that the Ford court put forth in support of its
decision is the supposed detrimental effect upon the attorney-client
privilege. According to the Third Circuit, the attorney-client privilege
is meant to encourage "full and frank communications between an
attorney and client, without the fear of disclosure, so as to aid in the
administration of justice."5 5

In defending their position, the court

went on to restate the Second Circuit's view that "with respect to the
attorney-client privilege, the limited assurance that the protected ma52 Boughton, 10 F.3d at 749.

53 See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
54 American Express Warehousing, Ltd. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 380 F.2d 277,
281 (2d Cir. 1967).
55 In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d at 963.
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terial will not be disclosed at trial 'will not suffice to ensure free and
full communication by clients who do not rate highly a privilege that
56
is operative only at the time of triaL"'
Unfortunately, this quote pulled from Chase Manhattan Bank did
not refer to an ordinary ruling on a claim of attorney-client privilege,
but instead reflected the Second Circuit's concern with the strange
manner in which the district court chose to deal with the materials in
question. In Chase Manhattan Bank, the district court judge's order
permitted plaintiff's counsel to examine documents that the defendant claimed were protected by the attorney-client privilege before he
made any ruling whatsoever on the merits of the defendant's claim. It
is exactly this kind of strange procedure to which the Chase Manhattan
Bank court is referring when they speak of a privilege that is "operative
only at the time of trial." Obviously, one can always find a phrase
which seems to support one's argument, but by simply pulling this
quote out of context, the Ford court failed to acknowledge the importance of the very unique circumstances being dealt with in Chase Man57
hattan Bank.
In contrast, the facts of Ford reveal no such strange or potentially
damaging circumstances. The district court's order was nothing more
then a basic ruling on whether the documents in question were privileged. There is a constant danger that a court might rule that certain
documents, thought by the client to be privileged, are in actuality not
protected. The ability to appeal immediately does not alleviate this
danger nor does it provide the client with any assurance that his communications will later be protected. Therefore, the Ford court's argument that this appeal must proceed immediately because of its
detrimental effect on the policies underlying the attorney-client privilege is unsubstantiated.
D.

Writ of Mandamus

Finally we look at the Third Circuit's claim that even if they did
not have jurisdiction under the Cohen doctrine, they would have had
mandamus jurisdiction over the case. While this off-hand comment
may be true, it completely failed to recognize the important differ56 Id. (quoting Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Turner & Newall, PLC, 964 F.2d
159, 165 (2d Cir. 1992) (emphasis added)).
57 Furthermore, in pulling this quote from Chase ManhattanBank, the Ford court
fails to mention the fact that, while the Second Circuit in Chase Manhattan Bank did
allow a writ to be issued, the Second Circuit actually refused to allow the interlocutory
appeal. In so doing the Second Circuit stated, "We thus reaffirm our long-stated view
that Cohen does not provide jurisdiction to review interlocutory discovery orders."
Chase ManhattanBank, 964 F.2d at 163.
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As stated by the Supreme Court, "The remedy of mandamus is a
drastic one . . . 'only exceptional circumstances amounting to ajudicial "usurpation of power" will justify the invocation of this extraordinary remedy."' 5 8 And to ensure that writs of mandamus are issued
only in these extraordinary situations, "the Supreme Court has established two prerequisites to the issuance of a writ: (1) that petitioner
have no other 'adequate means to attain the [desired] relief,' and (2)
that petitioner meet its burden of showing that its right to the writ is
'clear and indisputable."'-59
Some jurisdictions, taking very seriously the Supreme Court's admonition that federal appellate courts are to exercise their writ power
with caution, have required an even higher standard than this twopart test. For example, many courts, including the Supreme Court,
have based their decisions regarding mandamus jurisdiction on
60
whether the case at hand raises any questions of first impression.
Other courts, like the Ninth Circuit, have promulgated a series of factors to be considered and weighed when making this determination.
These include:
(1) whether the party seeking the writ has no other adequate
means, such as direct appeal, to attain the relief he desires;
(2) whether the petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way
that is not correctable on appeal;
(3) whether the district court's order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law;
(4) whether the district court's order is an oftrepeated error or
manifests persistent disregard for the federal rules; and
(5) whether the district court's order raises new and important
61
problems or issues of law of first impression.
While it is within a court's discretion whether they choose to utilize
any of these factors in making its mandamus determination, it is imperative for a court to remember that a writ of mandamus is an extreme and extraordinary measure. By treating it as such, the court
can properly protect the policy considerations underlying the rule. Issuing a writ not only forces the district court judge to become a liti58 Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976) (quoting Will v.
United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967)).
59 Haines v. Liggett Group Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 89 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Kerr,426
U.S. at 403).
60 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
61 Bank of Am. v. Feldman (In re Nat'l Mortgage Equity Corp. Mortgage Pool
Certificates Litig.), 821 F.2d 1422, 1425 (9th Cir. 1987).
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gant in the matter, it places a heavy burden upon already crowded
lower court dockets by encouraging piecemeal litigation. 62 Furthermore, in regards to legislative intent the Court in Kerr stated,
It has been Congress' determination since the Judiciary Act of 1789
that as a general rule "appellate review should be postponed... until after final judgment has been rendered by the trial
court." A judicial readiness to issue the writ of mandamus in anything less than an extraordinary situation would run the real risk of
defeating the 3very policies sought to be furthered by that judgment
6
of Congress.
If these considerations are not addressed the entire purpose of the
final order doctrine of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 is entirely abandoned.
Unfortunately, it seems that none of these considerations were
taken into account by the Ford court. In this case, there existed no
issues of first impression and most certainly no extraordinary or extreme circumstances. But what is most troubling about the Third Circuit's handling of the mandamus issue are its comments in relation to
appellate jurisdiction. The Ford court stated:
[M] andamus jurisdiction affords an appellate court less opportunity
to correct district court error in the case before it and less opportunity to provide guidance for future cases. Moreover, comity between the district and appellate courts is best served by resort to
mandamus only in limited circumstances. Review under appellatejurisdictionis therefore preferable to review under mandamusjurisdiction. In
light of this preference, the wisdom of our holding that an appeal will lie in
64
this case is confirmed.

In other words, according to the Ford court, its holding that an ordinary appeal will lie in this case is buttressed by the fact that appellate
jurisdiction is preferable to mandamus jurisdiction. While it is true
that review under mandamus is exceedingly narrow, the lack of a preferred standard can in no way be grounds for deciding a jurisdictional
question. Instead of following proper procedure (first determining
jurisdiction and then applying the proper standard of review), the
Third Circuit seemed to be saying that it can take the opposite approach-find a standard which best fits the desired decision and then
"find" a jurisdictional basis to match.
However, it is without question that the issuance of a writ is
largely at the discretion of the appellate court. It must, furthermore,
be conceded that while most jurisdictions would probably not have
62 See Kerr,426 U.S. at 402-03.
63
64

Id. at 403 (quoting Wl4 389 U.S. at 96) (footnote omitted).
In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d at 964 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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found these circumstances akin to issuance of a writ, this court would
not have overstepped its bounds in so doing.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Third Circuit's decision in In re Ford Motor Company failed to
address a number of issues vital to a proper analysis of the collateral
order doctrine, including the legislative intent behind § 1291 and the
ability of an attorney to gain an appeal through the contempt process.
However, what is most disconcerting about the decision in In re Ford
Motor Company is the potential breadth of its coverage. The facts in
Ford reveal no unique or extreme circumstances that would justify
such a radical departure from case precedent. One cannot help but
read the Third Circuit as saying that from now on, each and every
discovery order that touches upon issues of attorney-client privilege or
work product doctrine automatically falls under the collateral order
doctrine and is immediately appealable. Such a reading will undoubtably cause district courts to become bogged down, appellate courts to
become flooded with a myriad of discovery appeals, and the Third
Circuit to become a mecca for forum shopping litigants.
On the other hand, one cannot disagree with the Third Circuit
that certain parties will be disadvantaged by the majority reading of
the collateral order doctrine. However, all rules must be viewed in
relation to the legal system as a whole, and although most rules work
to the disadvantage of one party or another, the effects of a rule upon
individuals must be balanced against its effects upon the system as a
whole. Congress, the Supreme Court, and all other circuits have
weighed these competing interests and have found that the possible
harm that may befall certain individuals is greatly outweighed by the
need to have a system that permits a fair and efficient administration
of the law.
The Third Circuit's decision in In re Ford Motor Company not only
fails to administer this balancing test but it also fails to even recognize
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the competing interests that are at the very heart of the 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 and the collateral order doctrine.
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